OMS Energy
OMS trades below book value with 80% of their book being cash & other current assets while generating $30M+ in profit. Reported fiscal year results two weeks ago.
OMS was a struggling division on last O&G down cycle at a Japanese conglomerate. It was going to be liquidated and current management bought it from conglomerate for $2M; full bargain purchase. He turned it around, secured deal with Saudi Aramco & Halliburton and IPO’d in the Nasdaq at ~$360M. Meng Hock owns 60%+ of shares.
The business trades at ~$175M market cap; has $153M in cash and $45M in other current assets; $35M in total liabilities. OMS employs ~30M of tangible capital and generated $33M in profit last year on $155M in sales; $52M in FCF.
OMS is a very lean operation, it has facilities in 6 jurisdictions and benefits from close proximity to customer plus tax advantages given their local presence in Saudi and Indonesia. How Meng Hock guided for modest growth in topline during the just-started fiscal year, lower SG&A, but also modestly lower op margin (20%?).
Main issue is customer concentration. They have a 10-year agreement with Aramco which is expected to generate $120-$200M in yearly sales (came in below range at $91M in FY26). My sense is there are reasons to suspect contract is doing well and might even expand; OMS has been awarded specific certifications that would allow it to up-sell Aramco.
Ex-Aramco, OMS’s business generates $60M+ in sales at 30-40% gross margins, compared to their Aramco segment’s 25-30%. It’s focused on mostly recurring services to customers like Weatherford, Shell, Chevron, and has grown substantially over the past 5 years.
OMS is mispriced because it’s severely undiscovered. No one mentions the business, not even on Twitter. It IPO’d last year. No fund holds 5% of the stock. Tight liquidity given CEO’s stake makes it even harder for funds to purchase, for liquidity and governance reasons.
HireQuest
Staffing services for mostly light industrial and commercial, short-term jobs. Daily dispatch model. Differentiates from industry by following a decentralized franchising model vs company-owned offices; many advantages to model, ~1-2% larger profit margin on system-wide sales.
Profitable every year for 2-3 decades. Hermanns is candidate to extraordinary operator. Very lean model. Grows mainly by acquisitions (pays 3-5x adj ebitda). $20M share buyback announced when stock was truly undervalued (running at full volume). Industry now recovering from longest down cycle Hermanns has seen in 30ys. Operating leverage kicking in and sales should grow at 15%-30% over next year.
They’re going after TrueBlue’s on-demand portion of People Ready division (~$800M in sales vs HQI’s ~$450M; ~400 ofices). HireQuest offered $105M all-cash-deal in May, rejected by TBI’s board. Economics: HQI converts the 400 offices into franchises, sells them for ~$200k, maybe $100k seller financed; recoups ~$40M of price paid, $40M seller-financed. And People Ready might do ~$20M in profit, so they’d increase profit by $20M for a price of $20M (?).
Main issue is margin of safety having been largely eroded. Business trades at $180M mkt cap, no debt currently, with normalized EBIT of ~$12-$15M; has no heavy assets but $40M in receivables. If they don’t acquire another business, it’s not a bargain.
Irsa
Argentinian high-quality real estate conglomerate. Owns 18 shopping malls, a few premium offices, owns and operates 3 key hotels. Mainly from malls, should generate ~$150-$200M in normalized EBIT with low-millions maint CapEx and little overhead (pure royalty model for malls). Business trades at $1.3B market cap; roughly at book value, but assets are too conservatively priced.
Irsa stabilized balance sheet over past 6 years, paid 10-20% in yearly dividends, and now turning to growth. They’re acquiring malls and they own a lot of land in premium locations that’s being developed for residential projects, expecting demand from Argentina’s growth. They strike deals with developers, whom pay Irsa in cash for development rights + built sqm. Management hinted turning into new RE industries for growth. History of good capital allocation. Never defaulted on debt in 30+ years.
Main issue: Attractively priced for a ~15% return (EBIT yield), but Argentina always has that binary element to it + I expect growth from residential and new projects, but current portfolio is only expected to grow at GDP + a few points.
SuperCom
Hardware + SaaS model. Ankle bracelets for criminal offenders; electronic monitoring technology. Strikes deals with governments to deploy 100-10,000 units per contract.
Business struggled since its founding, under two different management teams. Ordan Trabelsi, family of former CEO (?), was first US employee in 2014; led US business from 0 to ~$10M in sales. In 2021, Ordan took over struggling parent company. He shut down previous unprofitable, one-off business, and focused on current hardware + ARR model. Revenue grew from $12.3M in 2021 to $27.9M in 2025; net income went from -$6.7M to $3.75M. Debt was reduced by 50% (multiple debt-to-equity conversions at premium prices).
Ton of momentum: secured 20+ national contracts in EU and, since mid 2024, 40+ county-level contracts in the US + Arizona state-level contract. Largest is Sweden, awarded in 2026; base case is $17M and customer budget is $75M.RPOs stood at $55M at Dec 25, with $21M to be recognized as revenue in 2026. Growth could be expected to come at 40%+ in 2026. Margins have not yet shown normalized levels, but operating margins if SaaS is main contributor might be ~25%+. If hardware dominates, ~10%.
Trades at $55M mkt cap. Net debt of $10M, but has $24M in receivables. If things go decently, it’s trading at 3-4x 2026 ebitda. Has ~$70M in NOL carryforward.
Main issues:
Terrible economic model (in EU at least). They recognize a lot of revenue upfront but get paid over time, so ARs are very high. Negative cash flow every past year.
Dilution was a risk until very recently. Maybe remains a risk.
Not sure if they are playing accounting games.
Total Telcom (Canadian dollars)
Trades at $12.6M mkt cap, ~$8M EV and on track to generate $800k+ in operating income in current FY and growing at 30%.
Hardware + ‘SaaS’ model. Many services, but essentially a remote asset-tracking offering, which then needs ongoing data. Current growth vertical is in a water-level tracker combined with surveillance monitoring; rebranded as Site-trax in March 2026. Struck 3 deals with South American providers and is in conversation with government organizations for large-scale deployments. Additionally, they sold the IP for two of their products, on which they’ll earn a royalty per unit built by a manufacturer; 100% margin onward, could add hundreds of thousands in profit.
Lean operation, sales growing at 20%+, 20% operating margin and expanding, ~40% of sales are recurring but portion will expand as they deploy hardware.
My sense is that, even while not cheap on a relative basis now (I purchased shares at an EV of ~$4M, business has been historically profitable, management seems good, especially now with Andreola on the board; and as new opportunities ramp up, any deal can mean a 2-3x in valuation. I think that might happen over next 6-12mo based on their press releases and starting to recognize revenue in South America, meaning trials are ongoing. Market seems to already be getting ahead of it.
Thermal Energy International (Canadian dollars)
Business trades at an EV of ~$24M. Margins were depressed in 2024-25 after management invested in capacity (engineers and salespeople). Business grew 60% last Q, 17% previous Q, and will likely grow at 35%+ in the next Q (last of FY). It’s at a ~$40M run rate and normalized op margins might be ~12%. Trading at normalized ~5x EV/EBIT. (Current op margin at 4%).
They help manufacturing companies recapture heat lost during the normal course of operation, while saving a lot of money doing so. The ROI on their machines & services are 3-5 years. Have been working with multinational companies for 2 decades; many repeat customers like Pepsi.
William Crossland has led the business since late 2000s. Has done a few small but good acquisitions, leveraged up the business when sensible, now runs a clean balance sheet,invested in extra capacity in response to excess demand, and has bought back some shares.
Very well run operation, almost no competition. CEO has hinted he aims at 15-25%+ growth yearly. Already within their customers’ manufacuting sites (1,000), TMG has <7% penetration.
Cleantek Industries (Canadian dollars)
Cleantek trades at $16M market cap and has $9M net debt. Since 2019: revenue grew from $1M to $13.7M last year; gross margin expanded from 35% to 62%; from millions in losses and a “Going Concern risk” to $900k in net profit in 2025. Cleantek has ~$60M in NOL carryforward.
Riley Taggart (deep operational background in Baker Hughes and did his academic thesis in micro-cap energy sentiment) took over as CEO in mid 2024 when the company was on the verge of a covenant default and the ship started turning. Cleantek had a $3M working capital deficit and now is $800k positive. Book value was $400k in Dec ‘23 and now exceedes $3M. He optimized the asset base by refurbushing machines and secured a ~$7M deal that drove their 2026 guidance to $22M (+50% YoY) with $7.3M in EBITDA.
The business mainly rents and sells huge lighttowers used for oil rigs; they are fueled by solar and lithium, are less expensive than traditional options, are more efficient, and their lighting is much more intensive and broad. Like Thermal Energy, it saves customers money while helping them meet their ESG mandates. Customers are mostly in NA, with many of them renting towers for multiple rigs, though the large 2026 contract will be shipped to the Middle East.
Cleantek used to operate legacy, diesel-powered wastewater disposal machines. They were lost in the asset base and Riley is refurbishing them into being natural-gas-based. Less costly, more efficient. Each of these machines (fleet of ~50 by 2027) could generate ~$500k/yr in sales. By refurbishing, instead of building from the ground up, they save ~$200k-$400k per machine.
Margin of safety is smaller than in other investments, but asset value severely underestimates replacement cost and true earnings power of the whole fleet. Lighting towers have rental capacity for $20M+ in yearly sales while wastewater machines of $25M+ once converted. At a 30%+ ebitda margin, assets should be priced meaningfully higher.
CEO is looking for M&A opportunities to leverage their tax assets and get uplisted.
NTG Clarity Network
NTG trades at a $35M mkt cap and has $3M in net cash. They have $39M in current assets ($30M in receivables) and $17.5M in total liabilities. It trades slightly above book value with most of their assets being highly liquid and with capacity to generate $10-$20M in operating profit.
Founder-led business from the 90s that ‘struggled’ until 5-7 years ago. They found an in-demand service and the way to offer it with attractive economics: NTG is an IT staffing/consulting company for Saudi Arabian large businesses in many industries (50% in banking). They have offices and hire most workers in Egypt, benefiting from salary arbitrage while employees are high-quality, tech savvy, and speak the same language as clients. Their offering seems valuable; 134% in NRR and 99.3% in gross dollar retention in 2025.
Revenue had been declining and grew from $8M in 2019 to $83M in 2025. NTG went from operating losses to ~$10M in operating profit, and their operating margin has oscillated between 8%-22%. Demand is fueled by Saudi’s government attempt to diversify away from oil and gas, promoting other industries. They have a target to hit by 2030 and are committing capital to it.
Stock dropped 70% from peak last year for I think four main reasons:
NTG hired in excess of demand, expecting large contracts to ramp up. This hasn’t happened yet. Excess capacity + holidays led to op margin dropping to 3% last Q.
They use to run on negative net working capital. As they grew, accounts receivable increased a lot. Though they have systematically collected 99%+ of ARs, market might not know how to think about scale economics. Management said they’ll focus on getting cash cycles back on track but have struggled in doing so.
My take is that, even if ARs stay at these levels, it’s normal for a business generating $85M in yearly sales.
Growth stalled. If they hit low-end guidance, sales will grow ~8%.
Consulting and IT-related businesses are out of favor.
Guidance for 2026 is $90M in sales and 13%-16% in adj ebitda margin (8-10% op margin). They reaffirmed guidance even after their first Q came in at $21M and 3% op margin. CEO had said in Q4 call that their Q1 was expected to be like this. I think they’ll hit guidance, considering it’s conservatively estimated, supported by backlog and ‘low-risk- renewals.
Disclosure: This is not a recommendation to buy or sell any security. In addition, the foregoing write-up is just the result of my dd and opinion. Please do your own research.
Contact: giulianomana@0to1stockmarket.com
I have looked at this company over and over again and it just screams china scam. They have unlimited cash but refuse to do a dividend or even buy back stock. It's very bizarre.
TMG sounds interesting, but why do you think normal margins are 12%? The business lost money cumulatively from 2011-2022 and margins have only been 4-6% over the past ~3 yrs?